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EETU PIKKARAINEN 
EDUCATION, VALUES AND AUTHORITY:  
A SEMIOTIC VIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
What is the relationship between values, authority and education? I believe one 
very probable first thought could be some kind of idea of moral education. Others 
might be sceptical, or hold critical views that education and teachers have now lost 
the authority they used to have in the schooldays of the elders of today, or that 
neoliberalism and commodification have wiped all old values out of education. 
Instead of these plausible suspicions, I will here argue that there is (still) a strong 
internal connection between all these three areas and it is not restricted to any 
special area of moral education. My main argument is that, on the one hand, we 
need the concepts of values and authority to understand what education is, and, on 
the other hand, we need the concept of education to explain why these especially 
human areas of values and authority exist at all. This theoretical consideration will 
not, of course, offer any practical guide to values and authority in education, but I 
hope this kind of analysis could also have some applicable practical consequences.  
 I will develop my argument in a framework of action theoretical semiotics 
which I have been building mainly on the theoretical heritage of A. J. Greimas. My 
application of Greimassian semiotics is, however, quite unorthodox and I have 
mixed in some central influences from Peircean semiotics and biosemiotics. This 
whole theory project is situated in the research of education, so it is educational 
semiotics or edusemiotics throughout. The most peculiar feature of this theory in 
comparison with other semiotic theories is that its basic concept is meaning instead 
of sign, which is seen as rather derivative. Education in this theory is viewed of 
quite traditionally as a transformation from animal to human, from the plainly 
biosemiotic to anthroposemiotic sphere. In this respect, it shares and leans on the 
ideas of classical continental traditions of pedagogy to which the idea of Bildung
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is central. One aim of the project is to make this cryptic concept more accessible by 
translating it into semiotic vocabulary. In addition to the above mentioned roots, in 
this study I will utilize also Robert Brandom’s notion of conceptual as a special 
characteristic of human rationality. 
THE FRAMEWORK: MEANING AND ACTION 
The basic concept of action theoretical semiotics is not the sign, as in semiotics 
usually, but rather the meaning
2
. Sign is a more derivative concept which can be 
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defined as anything which has (or evokes) a meaning. Meanings are always of or 
about something and to or for someone
3
. We shall call that someone the subject 
and that something respectively the object. These names must not be understood 
here as any ontological categories, but just names for the termini of a temporary 
relationship of meaning. When meaning exists or happens, it takes place between 
two poles whose roles may be different so that this relationship is not symmetrical. 
Just to tell the poles apart, they have these more or less descriptive names so that 
the object is the one of which or about what this meaning is, and the subject is the 
one to whom the meaning is. In other words, we can say that the object is 
meaningful and it means something or rather somehow to the subject. The basic 
question of semiotics is how an object can be meaningful to a subject. 
 The relations of any entity are part of its being, the way it is. Without taking 
sides in the ontological dispute as to whether relations are primary over their 
termini or other way round, I hope we can safely state that the relationship can 
affect the being of its termini, but also the entities can affect their relationships and 
via them also other entities. So, for example, the being of a subject can change so 
that at one moment it is in one way and at the next moment it can be in another 
way. Of course, its being must all the time remain somewhat, or in some sense, 
similar and stable in order that we have a reason to call it the same subject at all. 
Whatever change takes place in the being of the subject, we probably cannot easily 
and evidently say what caused that change. The change could be caused 
spontaneously by the entity itself or it could be caused by some other entity via a 
certain relationship between them, or thirdly it could be changed just by pure 
chance - or perhaps it is caused by the joint effect of all of these. (Pikkarainen, 
2013) 
 Further, we could assume that the way of being of all possible entities which can 
take part in a meaning relationship is active in such a way that they can at least in 
some circumstances cause changes to the ways of being of both themselves and 
others. The other side of the coin is a passive being, which etymologically does not 
mean inert stableness either, but rather is changing as a consequence of some 
effect, it suffers changes. So every relationship between a subject and an object is 
at least potentially interactive where both poles can affect and undergo changes to 
and from each other. Dewey (1985, 113) famously called this active and passive 
interaction as experience, but if we add to this his principle of continuation, we can 
call it action or interaction. This simplified basic framework for experience of 
meaning is depicted in figure 1.  
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Figure 1. The circle of interaction 
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Now the reader may protest that this is not at all about meaning but just about 
causality. However, this model differs from the received view of causality because 
this is two-way interaction between entities, and causality is often seen as a one-
way effect or determination between events. Nevertheless, we could situate in the 
scheme of figure 1 in  the place of subject for example some mechanical device 
like thermostat, or a simple entity like atom, and then we could discuss the 
question whether they experience meanings and what kind of meanings. I see no 
serious problem in this kind of discussion, but rather I would say that interactions 
between these kinds of mechanical or purely physical beings should be called 
causal, and it would be better to restrict them out of proper semiotics. But it is 
invaluably important to announce that probably all meaning effects and meaning 
experiences necessitate purely causal relations, even though it must be possible to 
make some clear difference between causal and meaningful. 
 The proper area of meanings and semiotics can be provisionally delimited with 
the concepts of action, life and competence. This delimitation is unavoidably 
somewhat circular, because we should not use any concepts from outside 
semiotics. For this reason, we must be cautious with the concept of life as a 
biological concept. It would be easy to say that only living creatures can 
experience meanings, but it seems too difficult to draw clear limits to living beings. 
Action is better because no other science can define it better than semiotics. When 
we study action as a meaningful object (i.e. “sign”), we discover that we can call 
action only those events and processes which seem to have a competent subject. 
Competence is the presumed or inferred feature of the subject, which makes it 
possible for her to act that way, to be the subject of that action (Greimas, 1987, 44-
46). So, when we discover that something is happening, we can understand it as 
some subject’s action if we can presuppose that the subject has the competences 
needed for that action. This means that we regard that subject as responsible for 
that happening. Life then can be seen as a whole of the actions of a subject. 
 There is thus something not empirical in action, because competences are not 
perceivable, but they can only be presupposed or inferred from a subject’s 
perceivable action. Here we have a necessarily circular definition: we decide that 
the perceived happening is that subject’s action, and then we infer what 
competences she has. But we must first presuppose that someone has the needed 
competences before we can regard her as a subject of that action. So we can never 
be absolutely sure, because competences are something internal to the subject. But 
there is also something else which is internal to the subject. We cannot perceive 
whether the subject is secretly plotting something, what kind of alternative actions 
she is planning, and especially what kind of meanings she is experiencing. It is just 
this internal side which differentiates proper semiotic action, as depicted in figure 
2, from plain physical interaction. 
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Figure 2: Action of a competent subject 
Now at last we are ready to define meaning as an effect of an object in the 
environment of the subject’s action which affects the course of her action. So this 
is quite a simple and straight forward definition with a somewhat biosemiotic tone. 
Some points must be stressed. The competent subject acts spontaneously and 
autonomously directing the course of her action within the limits and possibilities 
afforded by the environment. Although any and all of the objects in the 
environment can affect the subject and her action, it is always the subject herself 
who steers the course of the action - at least partly and at least the internal part of 
it. As biosemiotics has stressed, the environment of the subject consists only of the 
meaningful objects - or perhaps only of the meanings of the objects. This does not 
mean that the meanings were all conscious. That requirement would exclude most 
of the biosemiotics and also most of the normal actions of humans out of semiotics. 
It is only required that the subject actively, and according to her competences, 
takes in to account in her action the “passive” effect of some object or objects. 
Typically, this takes place when the subject perceives something, but it can also be 
that she knows or presupposes something about her environment, perhaps 
completely tacitly and unconsciously, and, as often happens, erroneously or 
fictively. 
GOAL OF ACTION AND LEARNING 
It is a deep common sense assumption that a competent subject i.e. a proper subject 
of some action has always some goal or intention why she acts and in what she 
striving for in her action. Juridical and often pedagogical discourse talks about 
motives. This will be discussed more later, but at the moment we can say that the 
goal is an essential part of the subjects competence. While action is always in some 
way goal directed and the environment of the action sets uncontrollable restrictions 
to the possibilities of what can happen, including that the goal will not be always 
achieved. Sometimes the action will be unsuccessful. One central or perhaps the 
most important initial function of meanings is that it can tell us whether we are 
going to succeed or not, and should we go on with our action, or should we change 
or stop it. This requires only that the subject can initially differentiate two 
meanings: good and bad
4
. The good or positive means that for example a particular 
perceived object is something useful, and either the action towards it should be 
EDUCATION, VALUES AND AUTHORITY 
5 
continued or perhaps action should be steered more towards it. Respectively, bad 
or negative meaning suggests that action should be changed  to some other 
direction, and the object should be avoided. This simple meaning structure can be 
depicted geometrically as two dimensional co-ordinates where the vertical axis is 
the amount and the horizontal axis is the contents of meaning. Here the different 
possibilities will be situated in a triangle shaped area according to figure 3. If 
meaning is low then it will be neither good nor bad, but if meaning becomes higher 
there can be a contradictory and tensioned situation where meaning can be either 
good or bad. 
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meaning 
Positive 
Low 
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Figure 3: The simplest meaning possibilities as “semiotic triangle” 
Learning as a competence change (Pikkarainen, [in print]) seems to be an essential 
and organic part of all competent and more or less successful action. The 
successful action in a certain kind of environment requires a certain kind of course 
of action and that requires certain kinds of competences. The subject can only act 
in those ways for which she has competences. If she cannot change the 
environment, then she is in need of a change of competences. As long as an action 
continues successfully, we may say that the subject can do that. Nevertheless, all 
the time learning is going on as the competence of the subject strengthens. As soon 
as the environment changes so much that the action does not success any more, we 
say that now she can no longer do it. At this time, the need for learning of course 
intensifies remarkably. If the competence of the subject changes so that she can 
again start to act successfully, we say that she learned (again) to do that. This kind 
of pragmatic learning can be depicted with the scheme of figure 4. We can utilize 
here the inference alternatives of Peirce so that the strengthening phase is called 
induction, the problem phase is the falsification of the inductive conclusion, and 
the search for new ways of action is an abductive phase (Douven, 2011). 
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Figure 4: The model of pragmatic learning 
When the subject’s action becomes more complex, containing separate action 
alternatives like eating, resting, nesting, reproduction and escaping, there will of 
course arise a need for more versatile meanings than just good or bad (cf. 
Stjernfelt, 2007, chp. 9). Depending on what action alternative is ranked highest for 
the subject, the same object can have a different meaning, but it can still be 
recognized as same object. A piece of food can have no or minimal positive 
meaning when the subject is not hungry, but it can still be recognized as something 
special – perhaps for future possible needs. Thus the object means food even 
though its meaning can be more or less neutral in the good vs. bad dimension. This 
causes the multiplication of qualitative meaning possibilities. 
 When more qualitative meaning possibilities arise, the previous model of the 
semiotic triangle will grow to a semiotic square (Greimas & Courtés, 1982, 309). 
In a semiotic square (see figure 4), high meaning creates similarly a tensional axis 
between some opposite meanings like food vs. poison, friend vs. enemy or 
generally good vs. bad. However, now also in the more neutral situation there are 
respectively two possibilities: not-food and not-poison, not-friend and not-enemy, 
or not-good and not-bad (see Floch, 2001, 20-23). Something which is not-food 
may have a lesser meaning, but it still can be poison, and on this occasion it will 
again have more meaning. Anyway it is important to know also what some object 
is not - and what else it thus can be. 
 
Good Bad 
Not-
Bad 
Not-
Good 
 
Figure 4: Greimassian semiotic square 
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This multiplication of meaning possibilities and their organisation in internecine 
relationships, which is depicted in the semiotic square, makes possible the 
specifically human conceptual learning and internal action based on concepts. 
However, this transition will not take place via simple pragmatic learning, but it 
requires education proper. 
EDUCATION AS BECOMING A HUMAN 
There is some difference between action and meanings of plainly biosemiotic 
subjects like animals and those of human subjects. Before we go to the disputed 
question about what is the difference and how deep it is, it is better to stress the 
similarities first. Actually, we have here three levels: first, the physical or 
“physiosemiotic”5 level of plain causal relationships, secondly the biosemiotic or 
biological level of living and action based meanings, and thirdly the 
anthroposemiotic or human level. All these levels have strictly the same 
ontological basis. We do not need any ontological dualities or trialities and not 
even any ontologically loaded ideas of emergence. So the differences are only 
structural and functional, which means that entities of the lower
6
 level have a more 
simple internal and external structure, and their interaction with their environment 
is different. They are different and they act differently. Secondly, the levels are 
nested so that every entity in the higher level is also an entity of the lower level and 
it has all the basic features, possibilities and restrictions of the entities of the lower 
level. (Heil, 2003; Pikkarainen, 2013.)  
 There are some generally held views about the differences between humans and 
animals. Perhaps the most important are following four features: humans have 
ethics and moral responsibility; they have a hugely greater ability to mould their 
environment; they have an ability use concepts for abstract reasoning and yet a 
special kind of self-consciousness. These four features are connected together and 
form one whole. The moulding ability is possible because of abstract reasoning, or 
alternatively, the changing of the environment requires the development of more 
abstract concepts. The ability to affect other people requires ethical control which 
again, with the use of abstract concepts, makes self-consciousness possible - and 
necessary.  
 All these characteristics can be quite easily understood as features of a human 
way of action - not as fixed properties of human beings as substances. However, as 
ways of action, these require certain competences which are probably missing from 
animals, and perhaps also missing from humans as biological creatures. This is the 
critical starting point of classical conceptions of education and Bildung: The 
competences for human action must and can be created in action because they are 
not innate and they do not develop automatically. Their development, the process 
of Bildung, requires educational care, guidance and control - both formal and 
informal.  
HUMANIZATION AND USE OF CONCEPTS  
We can evaluate those previously mentioned characteristics of the human way of 
action differently. The ability to mould the environment so that it will transform 
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radically to be unrecognizable, or even to destroy it as a living environment is 
perhaps not such a special ability after all, regardless of its possibly fatal 
consequences. Also animals and all living beings do it but only on a smaller scale. 
All action is then effecting the environment, changing it somehow. Rather the 
abstract reasoning has made it just possible to use unforeseeably effective tools for 
it. So perhaps the use of abstract concepts and reasoning which makes this possible 
is the most peculiar and critical difference between humans and animals. It seems 
quite clear that this ability has become possible by the use of human languages. 
Only language-using humans can infer logically, monitor their own belief 
formation, reflect their desires and attribute thoughts to other beings (Bermúdez, 
2003, 188). These skills require the ability to “hold a thought in mind” i.e. to think 
about a thought and this is possible only through human language which codifies 
thoughts as explicit signs (Bermúdez, 2003, 172). 
 Here we must not think of human language as a communication system 
consisting of symbols which are just arbitrary signs referring to some objects, like 
the simplified language games described by Wittgenstein in the beginning of 
Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1981). It is true that the invention of 
symbolic or arbitrary reference is an enormous innovation affording a flexible and 
effective tool to communicate meanings, but more important is the possibility to 
use this tool in thinking. Coarsely this means that by mentioning in inner speech or 
auto-communication the name of some phenomenon a human can evoke internally 
the same meanings which would rise if she encountered that phenomenon really in 
her environment. In a similar fashion, Wittgenstein’s builder causes his assistant to 
bring a brick just by shouting the name. Actually Pavlov created this kind of 
arbitrary symbol for his dogs in his laboratory, but only in human use have the 
linguistic symbols made it possible that “[Hu]Man is freed from the enthrallment 
of things by giving them names (Thom, 1985, 289).” 
 A very important point is that human language is not primarily a communication 
system but a modelling system. This together with syntax makes it possible to 
frame an indefinite number of non-existent possible worlds (Sebeok, 1991, 56-58). 
Yet even this possible articulated reference to non-existent objects does not unveil 
the essence of conceptual thinking, but we must in addition to inter-word syntax 
take into account the intra-word structures. This means firstly that most, if not all, 
concepts are analyzable into content components, and in this analysis we must use 
other concepts. Secondly, this means that the words of language form an inter-
conceptual network where every concept is definable by other concepts. This is the 
core of Saussurean notion of language (Saussure, 1983) and the Greimassian 
notion semiotic system (Greimas & Courtés, 1982, 295). 
 Here, however, as Wittgensteinians stress, the language as a reservoir of 
concepts is not as important as the use of these concepts. A typical or possible use 
of language is the articulation of the models of existing or non-existent parts of our 
environment as we saw above, but there is still another use which may be the most 
important characteristic feature of a human being and human action. This use is 
reasoning in the form of inferring from one model to another. Robert Brandom has 
propagated an incisive name for this action as “a game of giving and asking for 
reasons” (Brandom, 2000; 2009). What is peculiar here is that the relations 
between the sentences or claims as minimal parts or forms of the models are much 
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more essential than the relationships between these expressions and their possible 
objects or referents. 
 The inferential relationships between the expressions are neither determined by 
the objects they refer to, nor by the fixed network of language solely, but rather 
they are formed just in this rule based action of giving and asking for reasons. 
Their basis is the commitment of the language users to logical rules like “if A and 
B then A” and - what is still more important - to rules of material inference like “if 
A is red then A is colored”. Our understanding of the contents or meanings of a 
concept is directly dependent on the material inferences we can make from and to 
the expressions where that concept is used (Brandom, 2000, 61). These rules of 
inference and contents of concepts are all the time questionable, and it is just 
because of this that we must submit ourselves to that continuous game of giving 
and asking for reasons - reasons for our beliefs, our actions, our linguistic 
expressions and our inferences. This is the metasemiotic function of human 
language, and the basis for our reflective self-consciousness.  
WHAT ARE VALUES AND WHERE DO THEY COME FROM? 
Ethics is one of the central characteristics of a human being and human action. 
Human moral behaviour has much in common with other social animals and it 
seems to be deeply rooted in our biological setup developed by evolution 
(Gazzaniga, 2009), but here I do not mean this basic heritage but rather the moral 
action and responsibility in connection with ethics as moral reflection and 
reasoning. Ethics as moral reasoning is of course based on the conceptual and 
inferential reasoning described above. But it is also the other way around, that 
conceptual reasoning is based on a certain kind of moral responsibility and 
normative commitment to the inferential rules and linguistic expressions. I will 
return this idea of Brandom a little bit later. 
 The concept of value is quite central to almost all kind of ethics - and yet 
important in many areas outside ethics especially in aesthetics. So let’s start from 
values. There are some two or three basic ontological assumptions about what 
values are. One is the objectivist stance which says that values are something 
existing objectively and independently of any subjects’ ideas about them. An 
objectivist can be either an idealist like Plato, who thinks that values are objective 
ideas, or more naturalist like Aristotle, who thinks that values exist in nature as 
essences. The other pole is subjectivism according to which values may be just 
some subject’s preferences7. Both or all of these views have serious problems, 
especially about the learnability and knowability of values. In addition to those 
problems, there is a conceptual problem about the meaning of the concept of value. 
Value is something that is or should be pursued, increased or sheltered. So it is 
something which is missing or it is in danger of vanishing. Essential to it is not its 
existence, but rather its non-existence. 
 As something non-existent or a vanishing object or state of affairs, value is 
similar to a goal of action. So it seems to be something subjective in a similar way 
as action is necessarily subjective. It must have a subject. But is subjectivism then 
right? No, at least from the point of view of pedagogy this would be a problematic 
stance because if all subjective goals were equally values then there could not 
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araise any ethical problems with them. All my doings were always valuable and 
right, no matter what others think. There could raise social problems but not ethical 
ones. So there must be a possibility to ask if this or that goal of my or your action 
is really a value or according to a value. A social or intersubjective solution cannot 
be either because one should be able to ask this same question about commonly 
shared goals. 
 The solution could be some kind of not-objectivist rationalism in the form of a 
Brandomian game of giving and asking for reasons. This solution in a way reduces 
ethics to conceptual reasoning, but it does not reduce the contents of ethics i.e. 
morality and moral problems to reasoning. Brandom (e.g. 2000, 33) stresses the 
Kantian roots of his thinking, and the idea that a human being is free to commit 
herself to rational rules of both action and thinking. Here we can follow Martin 
Kusch’s interpretation of Kantian ethics that a human being must first have - to be 
learned and inherited - the natural and conventional morals before she can apply 
her reason to these probably one sided and controversial principles and conventions 
of moral action and evaluation (1983). Actually, I suppose that the adequate 
learning of conventional morals - an ability to commit oneself normatively to any 
rules - is a prerequisite for rational commitment to all reasoning, both theoretical 
and practical. 
AUTHORITY AND PEDAGOGY 
As said above, every subject learns all the time as long as it lives and acts. No 
special educational authorities are needed for that. Yet we can say that actually the 
environment has that authority. It allows some actions and prevents others, and it 
requires certain kinds of competences from the subject for successful action. In 
pedagogy, this situation changes so that some other people, as individuals and 
collectives, take the authority and start to manipulate the learning environments 
and to require certain new competences. This taking of authority is not always 
necessarily conscious and wilful. For example, parents may just find themselves in 
that situation and start acting the way they remember their own parents have acted. 
But on the other hand, an educator’s situation typically stirs more or less rational 
reflection about the reasons for different alternatives of educational action.  
 Educating, like all action, has some goals and pursues some values. According 
to Greimas there can be two fundamental values or rather value pairs. One is Life 
vs. Death and the other is Culture vs. Nature. (These pairs should be situated to the 
semiotic square to get the proper value structure.) The first is the basis for all 
individual meaning horizons and the second is for all collective or social ones 
(Greimas & Courtés, 1982, 175, 361). He does not relate to each other these two 
pairs which form the high meaning axis of the most basic semiotic square, 
respectively in either idiolectal or sociolectal meaningful expression. My view, 
however, is that they are developmentally nested so that Life vs. Death is more 
original and it is the main value structure on the biosemiotic level. On the 
anthroposemiotic level there emerges the new value pair which is partly in 
dissonance with the earlier and in principle and at least in some situations start to 
control it. With this I mean that biosemiotically Life vs. Death is always identical 
with Good vs. Bad, but in social settings it is possible that Death or Not-Life (e.g. 
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suffering) can be better than Life or Not-Death (e.g. escape) if it happens to be the 
prize of promoting or sheltering the value of Culture. This hierarchical value 
structure is depicted in figure 5
8
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Figure 5: Structure of basic values 
While all learning and action initially takes place in the biosemiotic sphere, 
pursuing Life - whatever it consists of for that subject - and avoiding Death is 
raised to the cultural and thus anthroposemiotic level by education. Thus an 
educator must be seen of as a special source of authority, not unconditionally 
compelling and restricting like the environment of action, but rather as a moral 
authority which has an effect through the subject’s own commitments. With the 
famous Greimassian (1980, 206) actantial analysis this means that an educator is 
not a Helper but rather a Sender. However, the situation is not of course so simple, 
because the educator as an educating subject must have a Sender herself and she is 
acting by the mandate of the Culture. But if we regard Culture as a value rather 
than an actant, then we could suppose that the society which gives the statutory 
authority to the educator is the final Sender. Nevertheless, this is a problematic 
view because we earlier stated that values cannot be reduced to preferences and the 
laws and perceptions of society are just more or less shared and collective 
preferences. So a better candidate for the final Sender would be a tradition 
understood as a continuous conceptual research program (MacIntyre, 1988). 
Nevertheless, an educator is a mediating Sender who can often be seen also as a 
Helper, or rather an advocate of the educated in her relationship to society as the 
hermeneutic tradition of pedagogy has stressed with the concept of pedagogical 
relationship (Wulf, 2003, 31-33). 
PARADOX OF PEDAGOGY 
Values of education, and generally all action are thus either Life values or Culture 
values. The former are based on the being of subjects as subjects of action. They 
are means-end rational values of any action, but the most basic of them are those 
values which make it possible to continue to exist as subjects. Thus they are, of 
course, important and necessary, also in the anthroposemiotic sphere. The latter 
values could be any aims and contents of existing cultures and traditions, but the 
special anthroposemiotic core of these values is the ability to use concepts 
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inferentially. This is literally a critical ability, because it makes it possible to 
rationally criticize any ideas, actions and situations. This is the basis for human 
freedom but it is itself based on freedom. As Brandom (2009, 117) stresses, it was 
Kant’s greatest invention that human beings are free just because they can commit 
themselves to self-imposed norms and rules. By following self-made rules, human 
beings commit themselves to moral responsibility of what they do and what they 
should do. Only this commitment makes the inferential use of concepts and thus 
any rational deliberation of action possible. 
 This invention caused for Kant the famous paradoxical core problem of the 
theory of education: how can we reconcile freedom as an aim of education and 
coercion as its necessary means (Kant, 1992, 20). Partly this problem can be now 
reinterpreted so that the aim of education is to lift the educated to the 
anthroposemiotic level, and develop their anthroposemiotic competences, but the 
means of education must largely be biosemiotic. A possible direction for a solution 
to this problem could be the analysis of a modal structure of human competences. 
It is important to note that the question of moral responsibility and rational 
deliberation is connected to all action, not just some especially moral action. 
According to Greimas’s theory, there are four types of modal competences 
connected in every special competence of some doing (Greimas, 1987, 121-). 
These modal competences are respectively related to the modal auxiliary verbs: 
Want, Can, Know and Must
9
.  
 Finally, I will briefly draft a model of modal learning which could lead from the 
biosemiotic to the anthroposemiotic sphere, and thus realize the Bildung process. 
This learning will take place in three stages. The first stage is purely biosemiotic 
(and pragmatic). In it, the subject first wants to do something to achieve some state 
of affairs. Then the subject tries to do that in some manner. Depending on the 
environment the subject can or cannot do it and achieve its goal. Now, and at least 
after some trials, the subject will know how it can and how it cannot achieve its 
goal. This know-how will take a virtual form of a technical norm: if I want to get X 
in an environment Y I must do Z. This recurrent circular process is depicted in 
figure 6. In the second stage, the situation is social and the subject must take into 
account other subjects who have their own goals. Now there is, in addition to the 
physical environment, also the actantial environment with useful Helpers and 
dangerous Opponents and mighty Senders and Receivers. The subject must 
negotiate and accommodate its goals with the goals of others. The most important 
change on this level is through the new medium of negotiation: human language 
which combines the modelling and communication functions. This makes it 
possible to transfer to the third stage where the subject can explicitly discuss its 
aims and beliefs both with it itself as well as with others. This starts the game of 
giving and asking for the reasons, where the reciprocal commitment to the 
commonly understandable rules of reasoning is essential. Now the subject can 
rationally articulate and form its own desires, ideals and identity. (Stojanov, 2007.) 
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Individual 
Can 
Social  
Want 
Must Know 
Urging Restricting 
Figure 6: Model of modal learning 
CONCLUSIONS  
I have attempted here to outline the relationships of the concepts of education, 
values and authority. They seem to have multiple and circular connections. Values, 
as rationally deliberated and conceptually explicated ideals and goals of action, are 
the special characteristic of human rationality. The rationality of values requires on 
the one hand their authority over human action, and on the other hand conceptual 
reasoning as to why just this or these values must have more authority than others. 
The development of competence for conceptual deliberation requires special 
pedagogical action and a certain kind of education. That education must on one 
hand take the form of biosemiotic influence to the educated via reorganisation of 
the environment, but on the other hand it must take a form of just that rational 
game of giving and asking for reasons i.e. reciprocal serious dialogue. Our double 
problem as educators is at the same time to bear the authority of the mighty Sender 
and the authority of pure argument. A helpful aid to avoid the schizophrenia of this 
paradoxical situation may be to remember to rationally reflect on the final value of 
pedagogy, and order the means according to it and the situation
10
. 
 
 
NOTES 
1 For an English introduction to the concept of Bildung c.f. (Kivelä, Siljander, & Sutinen, 2012). 
2 For Greimas, meaning is the absolute precondition and starting point for semiotic research, but as a 
basic concept it is itself undefinable (Greimas, 1987). 
3 C.f. the Peircean triadic concept of sign in which the sign vehicle or representamen conveys something 
about the object to the interpretant (c.f. Peirce & Marty, 2012). 
4 Thom (1985, 284) speaks about attractor and repelling signs and Deely (2004) uses symbols + and -, 
and also differentiates a neutral alternative 0 with no meaning. 
5 Deely (2001) has suggested the term physiosemiosis referring to Peirce’s pansemiotic views. Although 
I like this term, I disagree with him to some extent about the nature of that phenomenon. 
6 Lower is not a pejorative term here but it means only the earlier mentioned items in the list, and higher 
respectively means later mentioned ones. 
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7 C.f. Kristjánsson’s (2010) quite similar analysis of alternative ontologies behind ethical emotion 
education as rationalism and sentimentalism. 
8 A natural conclusion is that there are no values in physiosemiotic level. 
9 See more detailed analysis in (Pikkarainen, [in print]; Tarasti, 2012). 
10 This reflective activity is traditionally referred to as a concept of pedagogical tact (Van Manen, 1991). 
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